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Abstract
In the dynamic two-sided market environment, overpricing one side of the market
not only discourages demand on that side but also discourages participation on the
other side. Over time, this process can lead to a death spiral. This paper develops a
dynamic structural model of the video game market to study launch failures in two-sided
markets. The paper models consumers' purchase decisions for hardware platforms and
aﬃliated software products and software ﬁrms' entry and pricing decisions. This paper
also develops a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to estimate dynamic
structural models. The results of the counterfactual simulations show that a failed
platform could have survived if it had lowered its hardware prices and that it could not
have walked out of the death spiral if it had subsidized software entry.
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1 Introduction
In many two-sided or platform markets, consumers join a platform to access goods that
ﬁrms aﬃliated with that platform provide, and ﬁrms join a platform to reach consumers who
have joined that platform. The number of consumers on a platform depends on the avail-
ability, quality, and prices of the aﬃliated products. The success of the aﬃliated products
depends on the number of consumers on the platform. In literature on two-sided markets,
this interdependence, or externality between two groups of agents that a platform serves,
is called indirect network eﬀects. Moreover, platform markets are often inherently dynamic
environments due to the durability of platform intermediaries and the aﬃliated products.
Two-sidedness and dynamics are important features of many key industries such as eReaders
and ebooks, video games and consoles, operation systems and software, DVD players and
DVDs, and smart phones and apps.
Some platforms may be able to grow rapidly from a small base because customers on one
side attract customers from the other side, but most platforms do not. Many banks launched
credit card systems in the 1950s, and almost all failed. Sony Betamax lost in the videotape
format war with its competitor VHS in the late 1970s and the 1980s, but Sony Blu-ray took
the lead over its main competitor, HD-DVD, only one and half years after its launch. This
paper asks why some platforms launch successfully but others fail.
Theory tells us that platforms need to get both sides on board to launch successfully
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2006; Weyl, 2010). In two-sided markets,
pricing on one side of the market not only aﬀects the demand on that side but also aﬀects
participation on the other side of the market. Hence, charging low, or even negative, prices
during the launching stage is crucial to achieve the snowball eﬀect. In practice, Amazon sold
the Kindle Fire slightly below its manufacturing cost to attract users during the launching
stage1, and yellow-page publishers oﬀer free advertisements in the ﬁrst year that they enter
1According to an IHS analysis, Amazon's Kindle Fire (8GByte) costs $201.70 to manufacture but was
sold at $199 at release.
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a local market.
To analyze how a platform grows or shrinks, we need to know how customers on both
sides of the market behave. In this paper, I set up a dynamic structural model that describes
consumers' purchase decisions on hardware platforms and their aﬃliated software products,
and software ﬁrms' dynamic pricing and entry decisions.2 To estimate the model I use a
data set from the 32- and 64-bit generation, or ﬁfth-generation, U.S. video game market
including three dominating consoles: Sega Saturn, Sony PlayStation, and Nintendo 64. Sega
Saturn failed during this generation, even though it had been very successful in the previous
generation. The counterfactual simulations suggest that Sega priced inconsistently with the
two-sided business pricing model and therefore was shaken out of the market. Sega would
have survived if it had lowered its console price to attract more consumers and hence more
games. However, it would not have walked out of the death spiral if it had only subsidized
software entry.
This paper contributes to literature on two-sided markets that has been growing quickly
in the last decade. Rysman (2009) provides a general review of the literature in this ﬁeld. In
those markets with positive indirect network eﬀects, one side of the market is always waiting
for the other side to act before taking its own action. Previous literature has emphasized that
platforms need to get both sides on board and solve the chicken-and-egg coordination
problem that Caillaud and Jullien (2003) originally pointed out. With a few exceptions,
previous studies have usually modeled the launch of new platforms as an event, not a process;
they have not focused on the start-up problems that new platforms face.3 This paper analyzes
2I do not model platform makers' decisions on price and entry for two reasons. First, both consumers
and software ﬁrms are modeled as forward-looking agents, and thus their decision-making processes are
complicated by themselves. It is extremely hard to go further to model the decisions of platform makers who
choose their price and entry taking into account consumers' purchase decisions and software ﬁrms' price and
entry decisions. Second, the goal of this paper is to study launch failures in two-sided markets, in particular
whether a failed platform would survive by taking alternative strategic options. To achieve this goal, I model
how the two sides respond to platform makers' choices and simulate the results when a failed platform takes
an alternative option.
3One exception is Evans and Schmalensee (2010), who show that a platform business needs to pass an
initial critical mass that depends on the nature of network eﬀects, the dynamics of customer behavior, and
the distribution of customer tastes.
3
the dynamics of platform growth and looks at how a price change during the launching stage
aﬀects a platform's formation process.
In this paper, consumers are heterogeneous, forward-looking, and have rational expecta-
tions about future software entry and prices. In each time period, consumers choose whether
and when to purchase hardware and aﬃliated software. The hardware purchase and the soft-
ware purchase are interdependent decisions. On one hand, the value of hardware depends on
the value of being able to purchase aﬃliated software, so consumers rationally anticipate the
software market when they make their hardware purchasing decisions. On the other hand,
the number of potential consumers for a software product depends on how many consumers
have purchased the compatible hardware. On the software side of the market, there exists a
ﬁnite number of separate submarkets. In each submarket and each time period, the existing
software ﬁrms decide how much to charge, and potential entrants decide whether to enter.
At equilibrium, given other agents' strategies, each agent's best response is the solution to a
single-agent dynamic programming problem. Furthermore, the equilibrium is the ﬁxed point
of the system of best response operators.
To estimate this complicated model, this paper provides a practical estimation procedure
that combines the Bayesian algorithm and the ﬁxed-point algorithm. In the outer-loop, I
use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw a sequence of parameter vectors from their
posterior distributions. In the inner-loop, for a given parameter vector along the MCMC
chain, I non-parametrically approximate each agent's value function and best response func-
tion by using the pseudo-value functions and pseudo-best response functions from previous
MCMC iterations. Then I adopt an interpolation approach to obtain each agent's contin-
uation value, solve for each agent's best response function (pseudo-best-response function)
and value function (pseudo-value function) given that other agents play their equilibrium
strategies, and store these pseudo-best response functions and pseudo-value functions for
future MCMC iterations. This estimation procedure does not fully solve the dynamic model
but incorporates the approximation and the interpolation approaches. The estimation proce-
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dure signiﬁcantly alleviates computational burden and makes the Bayesian MCMC method
applicable to estimating dynamic equilibrium models.
This paper contributes to the literature on Bayesian estimation methods that has been
commonly applied to static discrete choice models with latent variables.4 Imai, Jain and
Ching (2009), and Norets (2009) pioneered the use of Bayesian estimation methods for
dynamic discrete choice models. In contrast to those two papers, the estimation procedure
in this paper is designed to estimate dynamic games that are more complicated because
the equilibrium is the ﬁxed point of the best response system. This paper also extends
the estimation method of Pakes and McGuire (2001) to the Bayesian framework. In Pakes
and McGuire's algorithm, they approximate the continuation value using the average of the
returns from past outcomes of the algorithm, and the value and policy functions are updated
at a recurrent class of points, rather than at all possible points, in the state space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and the U.S.
video game industry. Section 3 builds a structural model of dynamic demand and dynamic
supply. Section 4 describes the Bayesian MCMC estimation procedure and discusses the
related computational issues. Section 5 reports the estimation results and examines the
ﬁt of the model. In Section 6, I conduct two counterfactual exercises to examine Sega's
alternative strategic options. Section 7 concludes the ﬁndings.
2 The U.S. Video Game Market
Since Pong was ﬁrst introduced in the early 1970s, the U.S. video game industry has grown
signiﬁcantly. In 2008 the industry grossed $22 billion, more than twice the total box-oﬃce
revenue in the movie industry, which grosses $10 billion. The video game industry is a two-
sided market in which consoles (hardware) act as platform intermediaries, and consumers
and producers of video games (software) are on the two sides of the market. On one side
of the market, console providers design and sell consoles to consumers who pay a one-time
4See Albert and Chib (1993), McCulloch and Rossi (1994), Jiang, Manchanda and Rossi (2009).
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ﬁxed fee for the console that allows them to join a platform. On the other side of the market,
console providers charge independent game producers a royalty fee for the rights to the code
that allows game producers to make their games compatible with the console. The royalty
fee is not a one-time payment; rather, it is a unit payment for each copy that they sell to
consumers. In fact, console providers manufacture all the video games themselves so they
can track sales for royalty collection. Console makers also develop and publish video games
for their own hardware platforms; in-house game titles do not need to pay royalty fees to
console makers. I treat their prices and availabilities as given to other independent software
ﬁrms.
To satisfy consumers' needs for the latest technology, console providers have introduced
new systems approximately every ﬁve years. The data used in this paper cover the 32- and
64-bit generation, or ﬁfth generation, of the U.S. video game market. The data include three
speciﬁc consoles: the Sega Saturn, released in May 1995; the Sony PlayStation, released
in September 1995; and the Nintendo 64, released in September 1996. One novelty of this
generation is that Sega, a very successful incumbent for many years in this industry, failed
to launch its platform and exited the industry. Additionally, none of the consoles was
backwardly compatible, eliminating the concern that a previously existing consumer base
might have given one console platform an advantage.
2.1 Data
The main data set is obtained from the NPD Group, a market research ﬁrm. The data
include the monthly revenue and unit sales of three ﬁfth-generation consoles, Sega Saturn
(Saturn), Sony PlayStation (PS), and Nintendo 64 (N64), from May 1995 through February
2002. Sony was a new entrant to this industry and the PS soon became the leading platform,
taking around 60 percent of the market. Nintendo was the main competitor of Sony and
had a market share of 37 percent. Sega ran a distant third behind the other two and
actually stopped producing in 1998. I take the ratio of revenue over unit sales in each month
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to calculate the console price. Since the sixth generation started when Sony launched its
PlayStation 2 in October 2000, the data set covers the entire ﬁfth-generation video game
industry.
The data set also includes the monthly revenue and unit sales for 1,697 unique game
titles released for the three consoles during this period: 240 Saturn game titles, 1,172 PS
game titles, and 385 N64 game titles. The data set was collected from 30 of the largest
retailers in the U.S., retailers that account for around 85 percent of video game sales. The
NPD Group extrapolated the set for the entire U.S. market. I take the ratio of revenue over
unit sales in every month to calculate the game price. The data I use to estimate the game
market only includes sports games. I did this because it is relatively easy to sort sports
games into groups, and using a smaller sample reduces estimation time. The data used in
the estimation contains 397 sports games divided in 29 software submarkets. Additionally,
I collected the data on user and critics rating scores for each game title from several large
websites such as IGN, GameRankings, GameSpot, and Gamasutra.
General descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. Up to February 2002, the installed
bases of users in the U.S. market for the Saturn, PS, and N64 were 1.28 million, 28.25 million,
and 17.17 million, respectively. The total unit sales of their aﬃliated video games were 8.09
million, 300.02 million and 111.55 million, respectively. Even though Saturn was the ﬁrst
mover, the console became the other system barely two years after its release, running a
distant third behind its two rivals.
2.2 Industry Description
Below I brieﬂy discuss the important features of this industry, the positive indirect network
eﬀect, the declining pattern of game price and sales, and the seasonality of console and game
sales.
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Table 1: Statistics of the U.S. Fifth-generation Video Game Industry
Sega Saturn PlayStation Nintendo 64
HARDWARE
Release Date May 1995 Sept. 1995 Sept. 1996
Provider Sega Sony Nintendo
CPU bits 32 32 64
MHZ 28 33.87 93.75
Starting price $399.9 $299.7 $199.8
Ending price $41.0 $112.2 $87.1
Average unit sales per month (million) 0.02 0.36 0.26
Installed base (million) 1.28 28.25 17.17
SOFTWARE
Total active titles 240 1172 385
Total unit sold (million) 8.09 300.20 111.55
Average units sold per title (million) 0.03 (0.04) 0.26 (0.48) 0.39 (0.67)
Average revenue per title (million) 1.25 (1.61) 8.47 (26.71) 18.73 (34.69)
Average starting price $52.66 ($7.83) $41.57 ($12.02) $54.57 ($8.16)
Notes: Summary statistics for Saturn are for the 82-month period between May 1995 and February 2002;
statistics for PS are for the 78-month period between September 1995 and February 2002; and statistics for
N64 are for the 66-month period between September 1996 and February 2002. Ending price, Installed base,
total active titles and total unit sold with any console are for February 2002, the last month in the sample.
Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. Data source: NPD group.
1. Positive Indirect Network Eﬀects
Consumers buy a console to access its video games, and game producers make their games
compatible with a console to reach consumers who own that console. The number of users
of a console is therefore largely contingent on current and expected availability and game
prices, and the number of games aﬃliated with a console depends on how many users have
purchased and are expected to purchase that console. Figure 1 shows that the installed
base of hardware and the software variety have the same growth pattern, implying positive
correlation between consumer entry and software entry.
On one side of the market, consumers decide whether to purchase consoles and games.
A console has no stand-alone value; its value comes from its compatible game titles. Figure
1 (a) presents the number of each console's owners during the sample period. The installed
8
Figure 1: Hardware Installed Base and Software Variety
(a) Hardware Installed Base
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(b) Active Game Variety
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Notes: (a) The installed base is measured by the accumulative units sold of each console in millions. The
monthly sales of Saturn were below 0.5 million units after January 1997. (b) Active games are referred to
those which has positive sales.
bases of PS users and N64 users grew quickly during this period. However, the number of
Saturn owners stopped growing one and a half years after its release.
On the other side of the market, incumbent game producers choose their prices, and
potential entrants choose whether to enter the market. Figure 1 (b) presents the number
of existing game titles sold for each console in every month during the sample period. The
number of PS game titles and the number of N64 game titles grew quickly. In contrast, the
number of Saturn game titles started to shrink from January 1998.
2. Console Price and Game Price Decline over Time
Console prices are shown in Figure 2(a). Saturn started retailing for $399 but in September
1995 cut its price by $100 to match the price of the newly launched PS. PlayStation started
at $299 in September 1995 and suddenly dropped below $200 in May 1996 before N64 was
launched. Nintendo 64 was sold at $199 when it came to market and thereafter was sold at
almost the same price as PS. Both PS and N64 cut their prices by $50 in March 1997, by
around $20 in June 1998, and by around $30 in September 1999. Overall, hardware prices
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were declining. It is widely speculated that all the major consoles were initially sold at a
price near marginal cost. Industry reports also indicate that console prices fell slower than
production costs, and thus the margin actually increased over time.
Figure 2(b) shows the average game price for each console over time. Software prices
increased slightly during the ﬁrst few months after a console was introduced, and thereafter
declined smoothly over time. Initially, N64 games were much more expensive than others,
but the price gap became smaller over time.
Figure 2: Console Price and Average Game Price over Time
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(a) Hardware Price
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(b) Average Price of Games
Notes: (a) Average monthly (nominal) prices faced by consumers in retailer stores for each console in the
U.S. market from May 1995 to February 2002. (b) Average monthly (nominal) prices of video games released
for each console.
3. Seasonality and Life-Cycle Pattern
Figure 3 shows the monthly unit sales of each console and the monthly unit sales of the
aﬃliated games from May 1995 through February 2002. During holiday months, November
and December, sales are easily double or triple the average sales in other months.
After adjusting for seasonality, both the console and game sales had U-shaped patterns;
that is, both grew initially until reaching a peak and thereafter declined. This life-cycle pat-
tern can be explained as follows. In the early months, very few consumers owned consoles
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and the small market size resulted in low game sales. Meanwhile, very few games were avail-
able, so the consumption values of consoles were low, and console sales were low. However,
as more consumers purchased consoles over time, game sales increased. Meanwhile, as more
and more new games were released over time, the consumption value of consoles increased
and console sales increased. At the end of the sample period, the new-generation consoles
and games were available, so the sales of old-generation consoles and games declined over
time.
Figure 3: Unit Sales of Consoles and Games (millions)
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4. Game Prices and Sales Decline with Age
An important feature of the video game market is that game price and sales start at a
high level then decline rapidly in the ﬁrst six months after being released. In Figure 4, the
horizontal axis is the game age measured by the months since introduction, and the vertical
axis is the average game price in (a) and the average unit sales in (b). The average game
price was around $45 per copy at release and then dropped to about $23 the following year.
The average game unit sales were around 40,000 in the ﬁrst month and then fell to around
5,000 per month after the ﬁrst year.
What drives game prices and sales to drop so quickly? A falling-cost explanation is
not convincing for this industry. Once a video game is developed, the producer only needs
to pay royalty fees to the console maker and pay for its own production cost. Both costs
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Figure 4: Game Price and Unit Sale at Each Age
(a) Game Price
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(b) Game Unit Sales
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remain roughly constant per unit over time.5 The most reasonable explanation is inter-
temporal price discrimination (Nair 2007). Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences
for product characteristics, price, or both. Consumers purchase consoles and games at
diﬀerent times, and, as a result, the distribution of potential buyers of a game title changes
over time. The diﬀerent composition of consumers at diﬀerent times induces game producers
to charge diﬀerent prices. Intuitively, consumers with high net valuations purchase earlier
than those with low net valuations. Thus, it is optimal for game producers to set high
initial prices to sell to consumers with high net valuations and then cut prices to appeal
to consumers with low net valuations. Additionally, the entry of new games leads to more-
intense competition and thus induces the manufacturers of existing game titles to cut their
prices.
3 Model Framework
In this section, I present a structural model to describe consumers' demand for hardware and
aﬃliated software and software ﬁrms' choices of entry and prices. The model is dynamic, time
5Coughlan (2001) reports that production and packaging costs for 32-bit CD-ROM games remains roughly
constant at $1.50 per disc. Nair (2007) reports that the royalty fee for the 32-bit Sony PlayStation compatible
games was pre-announced and held ﬁxed at $10 by Sony throughout the life cycle.
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is discrete. and the horizon is ﬁnite.6 There exists a ﬁnite number of hardware platforms.
Platforms' choices, including the entry fees to each side and the transaction fee, are taken as
given at the beginning of the ﬁrst time period.7 The structure of the model can be displayed
by the Figure 5.
Figure 5: Model Structure
On the consumer side, consumers with no hardware decide whether to buy one in each
time period. Each consumer is allowed to buy at most one hardware in her life-time.8 Once
she owns one hardware platform, she become a potential buyer for the aﬃliated software
products. The software side consists of a ﬁnite number of separate submarkets. Each con-
sumer can purchase at most one software product within a submarket. This setup of the
software market explicitly assumes that software products in the same submarket are sub-
stitutable and that software products from diﬀerent submarkets are independent. In the
context of video games, I deﬁne a software submarket that a game title belongs to based on
the console that game is compatible with and the game genre it is grouped in.9 I examine the
6In the application to the video game industry, I focus on the 5th generation. I assume that this generation
dies after 100 months (roughly 8 years).
7The model does not endogenize the platforms' choices. Rather, it describes how the consumers and the
software ﬁrms respond to platforms' choices. This can be treated as a two-stage game: in the ﬁrst stage,
platforms choose their prices to consumers (console prices) and the entry cost to software ﬁrms before the
generation starts; and, in the the second stage, with all the choices made by the platforms given, consumers
make their purchase decisions of hardware and aﬃliated software, and software ﬁrms decide on whether to
enter and what prices to charge. The model can be considered as the second stage of the two-stage game.
8Ruling out multiple console purchasing may potentially cause biases. This paper does not allow for con-
sumer multi-homing for two main reasons. First, including multi-homing purchase signiﬁcantly complicates
the estimation. Lee (2010) allows for multi-homing, but he does not model the supply side. However, the
model in this paper is an equilibrium model of both demand and supply. Second, precise data on the degree
of multi-homing is unavailable.
9For example, PS Football games is a submarket, PS Baseball games is a submarket, Nintendo Football
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substitutability of software products (see Appendix A for details). The preliminary empirical
results indicate that games grouped in the same submarket are strongly substitutable, while
games grouped in diﬀerent submarkets are weakly substitutable.
On the software side, each software ﬁrm is assumed to produce only one product.10 The
following events occur in each software submarket and in each time period:
(i) Each incumbent software ﬁrm decides how much to charge. Each potential entrant
draws an entry cost from a known distribution, and decides whether to enter. If it enters, it
starts to earn proﬁt in the next period. Price and entry decisions are made simultaneously.
(ii) Potential buyers immediately observe the software prices but not the entry outcomes.
However, they have rational expectations about software ﬁrms' entry strategy. They decide
whether to buy an aﬃliated software product and, if so, which one. Once she makes a
purchase in a submarket, she leaves that submarket forever.
(iii) Software entry decisions are implemented. We move to the next period.
Below, I ﬁrst describe consumer dynamic purchase of hardware and software, software
ﬁrms' dynamic pricing and entry, and lastly the equilibrium concept for the model.
3.1 Demand for Hardware
There is a discrete ﬁnite number of consumer types in the population (indexed by i), each
having the same preference for product characteristics but with diﬀerent preferences over
price. A hardware product itself has no stand-alone value; its value comes from the aﬃliated
software. Let Γilt be the expected value of optimally purchasing software associated with
platform l. The functional form of Γilt is derived from the software adoption portion of the
model, which will be described in the next subsection. The expected lifetime utility that a
games is another submarket, and so on.
10In reality, some software ﬁrms publish more than one software titles. For example, EA Sports published
more than 100 game titles from May 1995 to February 2002. However, it is computationally diﬃcult to
accommodate multi-product ﬁrms. This single-product assumption holds if the team of publishing a software
title is an independent decision maker and thus each team can be treated as a single software ﬁrm.
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type-i consumer can obtain from purchasing platform l at time t is
Uilt = Γilt − αiPlt +Xtγ + ζlt + εilt,
where Plt is the price of hardware product l, αi represents consumer type-speciﬁc sensitiv-
ity to price, Xt is the holiday dummy
11, ζlt represents additional hardware characteristics
observed by consumers but not by researchers and εilt is idiosyncratic consumer taste.
Since hardware products are durable goods, consumers are forward-looking when they
decide whether to buy them. The no-purchase option captures the value of delaying purchases
to a future period. I specify the utility of not buying at time t as the sum of the discounted
expected value of waiting and an idiosyncratic consumer taste:
Ui0t = βcEt
[
max{max
l
Uilt+1, Ui0t+1}
]
+ εi0t,
where βc is the consumer's discount factor and the expectation is taken with respect to
the distribution of future variables unknown to the consumer conditional on the current
information. As usual in the literature, εilt and εi0t are assumed to follow the standard
Type-I Extreme Value distribution and are i.i.d. over time, products, and consumer types.
Let St denote the information set that aﬀects consumer purchase decision of hardware
at time t. Then, a type-i consumer's dynamic optimization problem can be written as
Hit(εit,St) = max
{
max
l
Uilt, εi0t + βcE [EεHit+1(εit+1,St+1) | εit,St]
}
,
where Hit(εit,St) is type-i consumer's value function with information set St and tastes εit.
Let Hit(St) denote the expected value function, that is, the value function before consumers
11It includes two variables, Novt = I{Novermber} and Dect = I{December}, where I{·} is an indicator
function. Hence, Xtγ ≡ γNovNovt + γDecDect.
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know their demand shocks εit,
Hit(St) =
ˆ
ε
Hit(εit,St))dFε(εit).
Following Rust (1987), the integration with respect to the extreme value error terms has a
closed form, and the deterministic component of the consumer's value function satisﬁes
Hit(St) = ln{
∑
l
exp(Γilt − αiPlt +Xtγ + ζlt) + exp[βcEHit+1(St+1 | St)]}. (1)
Then, the probability that a type-i consumer purchases hardware l at time t is
Bilt(St) =
exp(Γilt − αiPlt +Xtγ + ζlt)
exp[βcEHit+1(St+1 | St)] +
∑
l
exp(Γilt − αiPlt +Xtγ + ζlt) . (2)
The demand for the hardware l at time t is
Qlt =
∑
i
NitBilt,
where Nit is the number of consumers who have not purchased any hardware product at
time t. Recall that a consumer is assumed to buy at most one hardware in her life time, and
once she makes a purchase of hardware, she is no longer an active consumer for the hardware
market. Hence, in this dynamic models of discrete choice demand, {Nit}Tt=1 evolves according
to
Nit+1 = Nit(1−
∑
l
Bilt).
3.2 Demand for Software
Recall that the software market consists of a ﬁnite number of separate submarkets. Be-
low I describe consumers' demand for software, and software ﬁrms' pricing and entry in a
representative software submarket.
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Software Utility
Let Jmt denote the set of software products available for consumers to purchase in submarket
m at time t. A type-i consumer's lifetime expected utility from purchasing a software product
j ∈ Jmt at time t (provided she already owns the compatible hardware) is
uijt = xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt + ijt,
where xjt is a vector of observed software product characteristics, including platform-speciﬁc
dummy, online rating score, product age, and holiday dummies;12 pjt is the price of software
j; ξjt is additional software characteristics observed by consumers but not by researchers;
and ijt is idiosyncratic consumer taste. Here, ψ represents consumer preferences in observed
software characteristics, and ϕi is type-i consumer's sensitivity to software price.
In the dynamic environment, the utility of not buying in the submarket m at time t is
the sum of the discounted expected value of waiting and an idiosyncratic consumer taste:
uim0t = βcEt
[
max{ max
j∈Jmt+1
uijt+1, uim0t+1}
]
+ im0t
where im0t is the idiosyncratic taste from not buying any product in submarket m. ijt and
im0t are assumed to follow the standard Type-I Extreme Value distribution and i.i.d. over
time, products and consumer types.
Consumer Belief
Most previous research on estimating dynamic demand models assumes that consumer pur-
chase decisions are only based on a scalar state variable (the inclusive value) which follows
12Consumers' utility declines with game age in diﬀerent ways for new games and old games. So, I treat a
game as a new game if it has been in the market shorter than one year, and as an old game if it has been in
the market longer than one year. Hence, xjtψ = ψN64I{j is aN64 game}+ ψ1ratingj + ψ2min(agejt, 12) +
ψ3max(agejt − 12, 0) + ψNovNovt + ψDecDect, where agejt is the months after release.
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an AR(1) process.13 Such a restriction on the functional form of consumer beliefs is diﬃ-
cult to reconcile with a supply model, in which ﬁrms condition their actions on consumer
responses. This paper considers an alternative where consumers have rational expectations
regarding the future environment. They can calculate the equilibrium strategies for all mar-
ket participants as well as their own expected utility. This assumption is always adopted by
the theory literature and can be reconciled with a consistent supply model. Additionally, a
recent empirical paper, Goettler and Gordon (2011), also adopted the same assumption as
in this paper.
Information Set
Let smt denote the information set aﬀecting agents' choices in submarket m at time t. It
includes (1) the time period, t; (2) the set of available products, Jmt; (3) the observed
and unobserved product characteristics of each available product, xmt ≡ {xjt}j∈Jmt and
ξmt ≡ {ξjt}j∈Jmt ; and (4) the mass of consumers remaining, nmt ≡ {nmit}Ii=1, where nmit is
the number of type-i consumers who have not purchased any product in the submarket m at
the beginning of period t. Consumers can also observe the price of each available product,
pmt ≡ {pjt}j∈Jmt , and their own demand shocks in submarket m, mit = ({ijt}j∈Jmt , im0t).
Software Purchase
Let Git(smt,pmt) denote type-i consumer's expected value function. Then, it can be written
as
Git(smt,pmt) = log{
∑
j∈Jmt
exp(xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt)
+exp[βcEGit+1(smt+1,pmt+1 | smt,pmt)]}. (3)
13See Lee (2010), Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2011), Gowrisankaran, Park and Rysman (2011), and
Hendel and Nevo (2007).
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The probability that a type i consumer purchases software j ∈ Jmt at time t is
bijt(smt,pmt) =
exp(xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt)
exp[βcEGit+1(smt+1,pmt+1 | smt,pmt)] +
∑
j∈Jmt
exp(xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt) .(4)
The demand for software j ∈ Jmt at time t is
qjt(smt,pmt) =
∑
i
nmitbijt(smt,pmt),
where nmit is the number of active type-i consumers in submarket m at time t. Recall that
each consumer is assumed to buy at most one software product in a submarket. Under this
assumption, a consumer is no longer an active consumer in a submarket once she has made
a purchase in that submarket. Meanwhile, new consumers enter a submarket once they
purchase the compatible hardware. Therefore, the evolution of {nmit} follows
nmit+1 = nmit(1−
∑
j∈Jmt
bijt) + n
e
mit, (5)
where nmit(1 −
∑
j∈Jmt
bijt) is the mass of consumers who do not buy in period t and remain
active the next period; and nemit = NitBilt is the mass of new consumers who purchase
the compatible hardware l, as described in the previous subsection. Notice that the mass of
consumers remaining in a submarket is endogenous to the historic entry and pricing behavior
of all software ﬁrms in that submarket. The dynamics of entry and pricing introduce a
dynamic evolution of the consumer distribution in the software submarket m.
Total Software Utility
In the previous subsection, I specify that the consumption value of a hardware product
depends on the total utility from being able to purchase its aﬃliated software, Γilt. To
close the demand side of the model, I need to link it to the value of being able to purchase
the aﬃliated software products. Recall that a consumer who purchases a hardware product
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starts to buy the aﬃliated software in the next period. Hence, Γilt is type-i consumer's
discounted total value being active in all submarkets aﬃliated with hardware l at time t+ 1,
Γilt = βcE
[∑
m∈Ml
Git+1(smt+1,pmt+1)
]
, (6)
where Ml is the set of software submarkets aﬃliated with hardware l.
3.3 Software Pricing and Entry
In the 5th-generation U.S. video game market, a single software product was tiny compared to
the whole market.14 Hence, I assume that no single software ﬁrm can strategically inﬂuence
the sales of hardware, and so that software ﬁrms do not take that eﬀect into account when
they make their choices. Under this assumption, strategic interactions occur only among
software ﬁrms in the same submarket. Dube, Hitsch, and Chintagunta (2010) adopts the
same assumption. Notice that this assumption would be more tenuous for more recent
generations now that blockbuster games have become more common.
Below, I describe how software ﬁrms behave in a submarket m, that is, how the incum-
bents set their optimal sequence of prices over time and how potential entrants make their
optimal choices of whether or not to release a new product.
3.3.1 An Incumbent Software Firm's Problem
Let cl denote the unit cost of software aﬃliated to hardware l, including the production cost
and the royalty fee paid to hardware provider l. Both of the two costs are time-invariant
and platform-speciﬁc. An incumbent software ﬁrm's one-period proﬁt depends on its own
price choice this period (pjt) and its competitors' prices (p−jt); moreover, it also depends
on the state vector smt in the submarket m including the set of available products, product
14In this generation, the blockbuster games were smaller in magnitude. Among all Nintendo games, only
three games took over 4% of the total game sales on the N64 platform, and only 21 games captured over 1%
of the total game sales. Among all PS games, only ﬁve games captured over 1% of total game sales on the
PS platform, none of them taking over 2%.
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characteristics, and the consumer distribution.
Let βf denote a software ﬁrm's discount factor. An incumbent's optimization problem is
to pick a price to maximize its own discounted proﬁt,
Πjt(smt, pjt,p−jt) = E [pijt(smt, pjt,p−jt)]
+E
{
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tf
[
max
pjτ
pijτ (smτ , pjτ ,p−jτ )
]
| smt,pmt
}
,
where pijt(smt, pjt,p−jt) = (pjt − cl)qj(smt,pmt) is ﬁrm j's one-period proﬁt, the ﬁrst ex-
pectation is taken with respect to competitors' price choices in this time period, and the
second expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of future state variables and
competitors' price choices in the future periods.
3.3.2 A Potential Software Entrant's Problem
Every period, there is ﬁnite number of potential entrants outside the software submarket
m. Let Emt denote the set of potential entrants. The entry cost of a potential entrant j is
assumed to be λl + νjt where λl is the component that is common to all software aﬃliated
with platform l and νjt is a private information shock which is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed across ﬁrms and periods with c.d.f. Fν(·).
Each potential entrant j ∈ Emt ﬁrst draws an entry cost from a known distribution
and then decides whether to enter. Potential entrants are short-lived and base their entry
decisions on the net present value of entering today; they do not take the option value of
delaying entry into account. If it enters, it pays the entry cost and starts to earn proﬁt next
period; if not, it earns zero proﬁts.
Let yjt+1 = 1 denote that entrant j decides to enter at time t. A potential entrant j's
optimization problem is to compare the entry cost and the expected proﬁt. The optimal
strategy is to enter if the expected proﬁt exceeds the entry cost and not to enter otherwise.
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3.3.3 Perceived Strategy Function
Because a potential entrant's entry decision depends on its own entry cost shock νjt which
is unobservable to consumers and other software ﬁrms, other agents cannot know exactly
a potential entrant's entry strategy even if they can observe the actual outcomes. We can
deﬁne a set of conditional choice probabilities for j ∈ Emt such that
ρjt(smt) =
ˆ
I(yjt+1(smt, νjt) = 1)dFν(νjt),
where I(·) is the indicator function. The probabilities represent the expected behavior of
entrant j from the point of view of consumers and the rest of the software ﬁrms. The game
has a Markov structure, and I assume that each software ﬁrm plays Markov strategies. In
particular, if smt = sm′t, then ﬁrm j's decision in submarket m and m
′ are the same. Let
Ψ = {Ψjt(smt)} be a set of strategy functions or decision rules, one for each software ﬁrm,
with Ψjt(smt) = pjt(smt) if j is an incumbent ﬁrm and Ψjt(smt) = ρjt(smt) if j is a potential
entrant.
3.3.4 Incumbent's Bellman Equation
Let Vjt(smt | Ψ) denote the expected net present value of all future cash ﬂows to incumbent
ﬁrm j ∈ Jmt at state vector smt, computed under the presumption that consumers respond
optimally and other software ﬁrms follow their strategies in Ψ. By Bellman's principle of
optimality, it can be written as
Vjt(smt | Ψ) = max
p˜jt
pijt(smt, p˜jt, p−jt) + βfE [Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ) | smt, p˜jt,Ψ−jt] , (7)
where
E [Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ) | smt, pjt,Ψ−j ] =
ˆ
ξmt+1
 ∑
ymt+1
Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ)fj(ymt+1 | smt, pjt,Ψ−jt)
 dξmt+1
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is the expected value function conditional on ﬁrm j choosing pjt and the other ﬁrms behaving
according to Ψ. Here, the conditional transition probability function is given by
fj(ymt+1 | smt, pjt,Ψ−j) =
∏
k∈Emt
ρkt(smt)
ykt+1(1− ρkt(smt))1−ykt+1 . (8)
The optimal pricing strategy in response to proﬁle Ψ is the solution of the right-hand side
of equation (7), denoted as pjt(smt | Ψ).
3.3.5 Entrant's Bellman Equation
Let V ejt(smt, νjt | Ψ) denote the expected net present value of all future cash ﬂows to potential
entrant j ∈ Emt at state vector smt and entry cost shock νjt, computed under the presumption
that consumers respond optimally and other software ﬁrms behave according to strategy
proﬁle Ψ:
V ejt(smt, νjt | Ψ) = max
y˜jt+1
y˜jt+1 {−λl − νjt + βfE[Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ) | smt,Ψ]} ,
where
E[Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ) | smt,Ψ] =
ˆ
ξmt+1
[∑
ymt+1
Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ)fj(ymt+1 | smt,Ψ)
]
dξmt+1
is the expected value function conditional on on software ﬁrm j choosing entering and the
other software ﬁrms behaving according to strategy proﬁle Ψ. Here, the conditional transition
probability function is given by
fj(ymt+1 | smt,Ψ) =
∏
k∈Emt,k 6=j
ρkt(smt)
ykt+1(1− ρkt(smt))1−ykt+1 , (9)
where the jth dimension of ymt+1 is equal to one.
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The optimal entry decision follows a cutoﬀ rule characterized by
yjt+1(smt, νjt | Ψ) =

1, if νjt ≤ ν¯jt(smt | Ψ)
0, otherwise
where
ν¯jt(smt | Ψ) = βfE[Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ) | smt,Ψ]− λm
is the cutoﬀ entry cost shock for which the potential entrant is indiﬀerent between entering
and staying out of the submarket. Then, the probability of entering is
ρjt(smt | Ψ) =
ˆ
I[νjt ≤ ν¯jt(smt | Ψ)]dFν(νjt) = Fν [ν¯jt(smt | Ψ)].
Therefore, the unconditional Bellman equation of a potential entrant j can be written as
V ejt(smt | Ψ) = max
ρ˜jt
−
ˆ
νjt<F
−1
ν (ρ˜jt)
νjtdFν(νjt)
+ρ˜jt {−λl + βfE[Vjt+1(smt+1 | Ψ) | smt,Ψ]} . (10)
3.4 Equilibrium Concept
This paper adopts the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) concept. The MPE in this model
is deﬁned by a set of value functions, {Git(smt,p∗mt), Hit(St)}Ii=1 and {Vjt(smt)}j∈Jmt , a set
of price functions, {p∗jt(smt)}j∈Jmt , and a set of entry functions, {ρ∗jt(smt)}j∈Emt , such that
equation (1) - (10) are simultaneously satisﬁed at every state smt. In other words, the
equilibrium is the ﬁxed point of the game deﬁned by equations (1) - (10), with the following
properties.
(i) Software Firms. Equation (7) implies that in equilibrium, when faced with state smt,
each incumbent software ﬁrm's pricing policy is a best response to other software ﬁrms'
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strategies and consumers' behavior at that state. Meanwhile, equation (10) implies that in
equilibrium, when faced with state smt, each entrant's entry policy is a best response to other
software ﬁrms' strategies and consumers' behavior at that state.
(ii) Consumers. Equation (3) and (4) imply that when faced with a state smt and price
p(smt), consumers who own a hardware rationally anticipate software ﬁrms' future pricing
and entry, and optimally make purchase decisions of software. At the same time, equation
(1) and (2) imply that in equilibrium, consumers who do not own any hardware make
purchase decisions of hardware by maximizing inter-temporal utility. In addition, the value
of a hardware is given by the equation (6).
(iii) State Transition. Software ﬁrms take into account the eﬀect of their actions on
the evolution of states in the submarket. The transition of consumer distribution follows
the equation (5). In the eyes of incumbent software ﬁrms, the transition of the product
availability follows the equation (8); and in the eyes of potential entrants who decide to
enter, it follows the equation (9).
4 Bayesian Estimation
In this section, I describe the estimation procedure in detail. Let θ denote the vector of
parameters in the model that need to be estimated. Let data denote all the data available
for estimation which includes two parts: (i) the prices and quantity sold of each hardware
product in each time period; and (ii) the availability, characteristics, prices, and quantity
sold of each software in each time period acrossM independent software submarkets. Hence,
data = {Pt,Qt, {ymt,xmt,pmt,qmt}Mm=1}Tdt=1, where Td is the number of time periods in the
data set. I assume that the data are generated from the model presented in the previous
section.
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4.1 Posterior
Let L(data | θ) denote the likelihood. Rather than using the maximum likelihood estimation
method, I employ the Bayesian MCMC method to sample the parameter vector θ from its
posterior distribution,
P(θ | data) ∝ L(data | θ)pi(θ), (11)
where pi(θ) is the prior distribution of the parameter vector θ.
4.2 Likelihood Contributions
The demand for hardware is a dynamic discrete choice model. I assume that the unobserved
(to researcher) platform-speciﬁc demand shifters ζlt are normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2ζ , independent across all products and over time. The distribution of the
aggregate demand shocks generate the distribution of the units sold of each hardware in
each time period. Conditional on the state St, the joint density of the sales of all hardware
at time t is
LQ(Qt | St; θ) =
∏
l
[φ(ζlt/σζ)/σζ ] |
(
J(Qt→ζlt)
)−1 | . (12)
where φ(·) is the pdf of the standard normal distribution and J(Qt→ζlt) is the Jacobian matrix.
To specify the likelihood contribution of the demand for software, I assume that the
unobserved game-speciﬁc demand shifters ξjt are normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2ξ , independent across all products and over time.
15 The distribution of the ag-
gregate demand shocks generate the distribution of the units sold of each existing software
product in each time period. Conditional on the state (smt,pmt), the joint density of the
sales of all existing software products in submarket m at time t is
Lq(qmt | smt,pmt; θ) =
∏
j∈Jmt
[φ(ξjt/σξ)/σξ] |
(
J(qmt→ξmt)
)−1 |, (13)
15In the context of sports video games, ξjt may capture such demand shocks as events related to the
celebrities on whom game characters are based, e.g., their performance in major tournaments and even their
scandals. Those shocks occur independently across products and over time, and thus it is reasonable to
assume no cross-correlation and no auto-correlation.
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To evaluate the likelihood, I need to derive ξjt, which is described in the next subsection,
and evaluate the Jacobian, J(qmt→ξmt), which is derived in Appendix B.1.
Next I specify the likelihood contribution of the software pricing policy function. Let p˜jt
and p∗jt denote the observed price and the actual price of product j at time t, respectively. I
assume that the observed price is proportional to the actual price, that is, p˜jt = p
∗
jtςjt where
ςjt is the measurement error that reﬂects discrepancies between the observed prices and the
actual prices.16 Furthermore, it is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution with mean
zero and variance σ2ς , independent over time and across products. Hence, conditional on the
state vector smt, the likelihood contribution of incumbent j ∈ Jmt at time t is given by
Lp(pjt | smt; θ) = 1
σς
φ
(
ln[p˜jt/pj(smt, θ)]
σς
)
. (14)
To specify the likelihood contribution of the software entry policy function, I assume that the
entry cost shocks follow an independent normal distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2ν .
17 Hence, conditional on the state vector smt, the likelihood contribution of entrant
j ∈ Emt is
Ly(yjt+1 | smt; θ) =
(
Φ
[
βfE[Vjt+1(smt+1 | smt; θ)]− λ
σν
])yjt+1
×
(
1− Φ
[
βfE[Vjt+1(smt+1 | smt; θ)]− λ
σν
])1−yjt+1
. (15)
Therefore, the likelihood can be written as
L(data | θ) =
Td∏
t=1
LQ(Qt | St; θ)
M∏
m=1
Lq(qmt | smt,pmt; θ) ∏
j∈Jmt
Lp(pjt | smt; θ)
∏
j∈Emt
Ly(yjt+1 | smt; θ)
 .
16In the data set, I can observe the revenue (measured in dollars) and the units sold in each month of
each game title released during the sample period. The price in each month is measured by the average
price in that month, i.e., the ratio of the revenue over the units sold. However, this measurement of price
contains some measurement error because the actual price changes during each month. Hence, I add the
measurement error term ςjt.
17We should notice that this assumption on entry cost shocks may not hold if we consider learning-by-doing
or technology spillover eﬀect.
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4.3 Estimation Algorithm
The estimation procedure involves two loops: in the outer-loop, I use the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to update the structural parameters; and in the inner-loop, for a given parameter
vector, I update each agent's value function and best response function by using the results
from previous MCMC iterations. This estimation procedure does not fully solve the dynamic
model but incorporates the approximation approach. Hence, it signiﬁcantly alleviates the
computational burden and makes Bayesian estimation method applicable to dynamic games.
Below, I describe the estimation procedure in detail.
4.3.1 Outer-Loop: Metropolis-Hastings (MH) Step
The posterior distribution in equation (11) is a high-dimensional and complex function of
the parameters. It is known that, instead of drawing the entire parameter vector at once, it
is often simpler to partition it into blocks and draw the parameters of each block separately
given the other parameters (see McCulloch and Rossi 1994, Albert and Chib 1993, Imai, Jain
and Ching 2007). Based on the model, I partition all parameters into four blocks: (i) the ﬁrst
block includes all parameters directly aﬀecting consumer purchase decisions of hardware,
i.e., the parameters in the utility function of hardware, θ1 = (γ, αi, σζ); (ii) the second
block includes all parameters directly aﬀecting consumer purchase decisions of software, i.e.,
the parameters in the utility function of software, θ2 = (ψ, ϕi, σξ); (iii) the third block
includes all parameters directly aﬀecting incumbent software ﬁrms' pricing decisions, i.e.,
the unit cost of games sold on each platform and the standard deviation of the pricing error,
θ3 = (cSaturn, cPS, cN64, σς); and (iv) the last block includes all parameters directly aﬀecting
entrants' entry decisions, i.e., the mean and the standard deviation of game producers' entry
cost to each platform, θ4 = (λSaturn, λPS, λN64, σν) .
Consider a particular iteration k. For each block l, the procedure goes as follows.
The ﬁrst step is to draw the candidate parameter vector θ
∗(k)
l from a proposed density.
28
As usual in the literature,18 I use the Random-Walk (RW) Metropolis chain as the proposal
density
θ
∗(k)
l = θ
(k−1)
l +MVN(0, κΣl)
where Σl is the candidate covariance matrix and κ is a scaling constant.
The second step is to construct the acceptance-rejection ratio, given by
η
∗(k)
l =
[∑R
r=1 λ
(k−1)
r Ll(· | θ∗(k)l , θ(k−1)−l )
]
fl(θ
∗(k)
l | θ(k−1)l )pil(θ∗(k)l )[∑R
r=1 λ
(k−1)
r Ll(· | θ(k−1)l , θ(k−1)−l ))
]
fl(θ
(k−1)
l | θ∗(k)l )pil(θ(k−1)l )
,
where Ll(· | θ) equals to equation (12), (13), (14) and (15), respectively; fl(θ∗(k)l | θ(k−1)l ) is
the transition probability, and pil(θ
∗(k)
l ) is the prior distribution.
Lastly, I accept the candidate parameter vector θ
∗(k)
l with probability min{η∗(k)l , 1}.
4.3.2 Inner-Loop: Fixed Point (FP) Step
Evaluating the acceptance-rejection ratio in the outer-loop requires evaluating the likelihood
which requires solving the dynamic game given a vector of parameters. The computation
diﬃculty comes in two parts. One part is computing the equilibrium strategies of all agents
which are the ﬁxed points of the best response system. The other part is computing each
agent's value function given other agents play their equilibrium strategies, which is the ﬁxed
point of a single-agent dynamic programming (DP) problem. In this paper, I develop a new
procedure of solving the ﬁxed point of a dynamic model suitable for use in conjunction with
the Bayesian MCMC estimation.
For a given draw of the parameter vector along the MCMC chain, I ﬁrst randomly pick
a subset from the entire state space for each period; then, for each given point in the subset,
I non-parametrically approximate each agent's equilibrium strategy and value function by
using the pseudo-best response functions and pseudo-value functions from previous MCMC
iterations; after that, I adopt an interpolation approach to obtain each agent's continuation
18See Jiang, Manchanda and Rossi (2009), and Imai, Jain, and Ching (2009).
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value, solve for each agent's best response function (pseudo-best response function) and value
function (pseudo-value function) given that other agents play their equilibrium strategies,
and store these pseudo-best response functions and pseudo-value functions for future MCMC
iterations. This procedure is similar to the method of Pakes and McGuire (2001). In their
algorithm, the continuation value is approximated by the average of the returns from past
outcomes of the algorithm, and the value and policy functions are updated at a recurrent
class of points (rather than at all possible points) in the state space.
Nonparametric Approximation of Equilibrium Strategy
One challenge in computing the likelihood is to compute the equilibrium of a dynamic game
which is the ﬁxed point of the best response system. In the literature, the nested ﬁxed
point approach computes the equilibrium numerically.19 However, applying it for relatively
complicated models becomes extremely diﬃcult and even impossible even for one guess of
the parameter vector. The two-step approach (Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007), sidesteps
the equilibrium computation step by substituting nonparametric functions of the data for the
continuation values in the game, which is in general much computationally easier than the
ﬁxed point calculations. However, this approach suﬀers from a small sample bias problem
and also can not easily deal with the unobservables.20
In this paper, I propose to use a kernel method to approximate the equilibrium strategies
using the pseudo-best response of the past iterations in which the parameter vector is close
to the current parameter vector. The equilibrium strategy of software producer j in iteration
k is computed as
Ψˆ
(k)
jt (smt, θ) =
N(k)∑
n=1
Ψ
(k−n)
jt (smt, θ
∗(k−n))× Kh(θ − θ
∗(k−n))∑N(k)
n=1 Kh(θ − θ∗(k−n))
, (16)
19The general idea is to start with an initial guess at the value function and substitute that into the right-
hand side of the Bellman equation. Then, at each state point and for each agent, solve the maximization
problem yielding a new estimate of the value function. Iterate this procedure until convergence. The
literature of NFP approach includes Pakes and McGuire (1994, 2001).
20Hu and Shum (2011) consider nonparametric identiﬁcation of dynamic models with general unobserv-
ables.
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where Ψ
(k)
jt is the pseudo-best response function in the iteration k. For incumbent ﬁrm j,
the pseudo-best response in price is the solution to the incumbent's optimization problem,
p
(k)
jt (smt, θ), and Appendix B.2 presents the computation method in detail. For entrant j,
the pseudo-best response in entering probability is the solution to the potential entrant's
optimization problem. Under the assumption of normally distributed entry cost shocks, it is
ρ
(k)
jt (smt, θ) = Φ
([
βf EˆV
(k)
jt+1(· | smt)− λ
]
/σν
)
.
In essence, the equilibrium strategies are approximated by the weighted average of pseudo-
best response of past iterations. In terms of computation, this method is much easier than
calculating the ﬁxed point of the best response system. Moreover, similar to the idea of the
IJC, as the number of MCMC iterations and the number of past iterations for approximating
the equilibrium strategies increase, the pseudo-best response function converges to the true
best response function, and the posterior parameter draws based on the pseudo-best response
functions converge to the true posterior distributions.
Basically, I combine the MH step with the FP step for a single iteration. I do not fully
solve for the equilibrium of the dynamic model but use the results from previous MCMC
iterations. This spirit is similar to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)'s nested pseudo likelihood
method that gradually updates the equilibrium probabilities and recursively obtains the
estimators.
Non-Parametric Approximation of Value Function
To compute the value function at a given state point, the conventional estimation methods
iterate the Bellman operator until convergence. It is computationally diﬃcult for relatively
complicated models. The IJC proposes a nonparametric kernel approach to approximate the
expected value function using the weighted average of pseudo-value functions of most recent
iterations. Unlike conventional approaches, in which value functions need to be computed at
all or a subset of pre-determined grid points in all periods (e.g., Rust 1997), the IJC algorithm
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computes pseudo-value functions at only one randomly drawn state point in each period, and
the integration of the continuation value with respect to continuous state variables can simply
be done by the weighted average of past pseudo-value functions. Thus, it has the potential
to reduce the computational burden.
One issue in applying the IJC algorithm to the current model is that it is a ﬁnite-period
model which is non-stationary; however, the original IJC algorithm applies to stationary
dynamic programming problems. Following the same idea as in Ishihara and Ching (2011), I
compute and store the pseudo-value functions for each period, and approximate the expected
value functions in period t using the set of pseudo-value functions in period t+ 1.
For consumers, the value function at state (smt,pmt) in iteration k is approximated as
Gˆ
(k)
it (smt,pmt, θ) =
N(k)∑
n=1
G
(k−n)
it (smt,pmt, θ
∗(k−n))× Kh(θ − θ
∗(k−n))∑N(k)
n=1 Kh(θ − θ∗(k−n))
, (17)
where Kh(·) is a multivariate kernel with bandwidth h > 0, and G(k)it (smt,pmt, θ) is con-
sumer's pseudo-value function at state (smt,pmt) conditional on that all software ﬁrms play-
ing the equilibrium Ψˆ(k)
G
(k)
it (smt,pmt, θ) = ln{
∑
j∈Jmt
exp(xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt)
+exp
(
βcEˆ[G
(k)
it+1(smt+1, pˆ
(k)
mt+1, θ) | smt,pmt, Ψˆ(k), θ]
)
} (18)
The approximated value function given by equation (17) is the weighted average of the
pseudo-value functions of N(k) most recent iterations. IJC (2009) show that, as the MCMC
iterations and the number of past iterations for approximating the value functions increase,
the pseudo-value function converges to the true value functions, and the posterior parameter
draws based on the pseudo-value functions converges to the true posterior distributions.
Moreover, the convergence of the approximated value function to the true value function
requires that N(k)→∞ and k −N(k)→∞ as k →∞.
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A similar method applies to computing the software ﬁrm's value function
Vˆ
(k)
jt (smt, θ) =
N(k)∑
n=1
V
(k−n)
jt (smt, θ
∗(k−n))× Kh(θ − θ
∗(k−n))∑N(k)
n=1 Kh(θ − θ∗(k−n))
(19)
where V
(k)
jt (smt, θ) is the incumbent software ﬁrm j' pseudo-value function at state smt con-
ditional on that all other software ﬁrms playing the equilibrium Ψˆ(k):
V
(k)
jt (smt, θ) = maxp˜jt
pijt(smt, p˜jt, pˆ
(k)
−jt) + βf Eˆ
[
V
(k)
jt+1(smt+1, θ) | smt, p˜rjt, Ψˆ(k), θ
]
. (20)
Store the solved best response functions (pseudo-best response functions), p
(k)
jt (smt, θ), and
the solved value functions (pseudo-value functions), V
(k)
jt (smt, θ) and G
(k)
it (smt,pmt, θ), for
future MCMC iterations.
Interpolation
However, to obtain the expected value functions in equation (18) and equation (20), we still
need to compute equations (17) and (19) for every possible point of the state space. Due to
the curse of dimensionality,21 it is computationally burdensome to achieve it even with the
nonparametric approximation method proposed above.
In the literature, the simulation and interpolation approach proposed by Keane and
Wolpin (1994) has been the most widely used for applications with ﬁnite horizon problems
with large state spaces. This method obtains simulated-based approximations to the ex-
pected value function only at a (randomly chosen) subset of the state points every period,
and obtains the expected values at other points as the predicted values from a regression
function which is estimated from the points in that subset.
In the spirit of Keane and Wolpin's method, I propose a new procedure to deal with the
large state space problem. In the ﬁrst step, I randomly choose a subset of the state points
21The number of possible state vectors grows geometrically in the number of agents and exponentially in
the number of states per agent. For example, if we have N agents, K state variables each taking on M
distinct values, then the number of possible state vectors for each agent is (KM)N .
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every period, and obtain the values at those points with the non-parametric approximation
approach described above. Next, I interpolate the value functions with a quadratic-in-states
polynomial approximation in that subset. Lastly, for each current state, I simulate a next-
period-state using the approximated equilibrium strategies, and then use the predicted value
at that simulated next-period-state as the continuation value. In practice, I simulate the
next-period-state for a ﬁnite number of times and then take the average of the predicted
values. This estimation procedure is similar to Pakes and McGuire (2001) where they never
attempt to obtain accurate policies on the entire state space, just on a recurrent class of
points.
This procedure signiﬁcantly alleviates the computational burden and makes it possible
to estimate models with very large state spaces and rich structure. However, we also should
notice that estimators of structural parameters are not consistent as long as interpolation is
used, because the approximation errors in the expected value functions enter non-linearly in
optimization problems.22
Recall that the state vector in the model includes the availability and characteristics of
each software product in a submarket, and the distribution of remaining consumers of each
type. In addition, consumers can also observe the price of each software product in the
submarket. Among those state variables, the product characteristics evolves exogenously
and deterministically; the consumer distribution evolves deterministically depending on con-
sumers purchase choices; the software product availability depends on all potential entrants'
entry choices up to the previous period; and the software price is chosen by incumbent soft-
ware ﬁrms based on the state vector. In terms of computation, it is extremely diﬃcult and
even impossible to include all of those state variables. Hence, I characterize each agent's
state vector as follows.
Consumers trace the time periods to the end, the number of software products available
22Note that approximation error in the expected value function is not the only source of potential inconsis-
tency, for example, discretization of continuous variables, approximate convergence of the Bellman operator
in inﬁnite horizon problems and others.
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for purchase, the distribution of remaining consumers of each type, his/her own mean utility
from the top-ranked software product, and the average of his/her mean utility from all
existing products. Incumbent software ﬁrms trace the time periods to the end, the number
of software competitors in the same submarket, the distribution of remaining consumers of
each type, consumer's valuation of the top-ranked product, and consumer's valuation about
its product. Potential entrants trace almost the same variables as incumbents do. The only
diﬀerence is that they trace the expected value of new product instead of the value of its
own product.
Computing ζlt and ξjt
Once we obtain the consumer's continuation values, we can compute each consumer's prob-
ability of purchasing from equation (4) and then the predicted demand of each product.
To obtain the likelihood contribution of demand in equation (12), I update the aggregate
demand shocks based on the expression,
ξ
(k)
jt = ξ
(k−1)
jt + ln(q˜jt)− ln
(
q
(k)
jt (smt, θ)
)
,
where q˜jt is the units sold observed in the data and q
(k)
jt (smt, θ) is the predicted quantity
using the demand shocks of the (k − 1)th iteration, ξ(k−1)mt . This procedure is similar to
the inversion proposed by BLP (1995). The main diﬀerence is that, unlike BLP, consumers
in this paper maximize inter-temporal utility, implying that the corresponding aggregate
demands, qjt(smt, θ), are a function of the consumer's value of waiting each period. Another
diﬀerence is that, unlike BLP which iterates the aggregate demand shocks until convergence
for any given parameter vector, I update it only once during each MCMC iteration. A similar
procedure applies to computing the aggregate demand shocks of hardware, ζlt, given by
ζ
(k)
lt = ζ
(k−1)
lt + ln(Q˜lt)− ln
(
Q
(k)
lt (St, θ)
)
.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Econometric Details
Consumer Heterogeneity. For simplicity but without loss of generality, I assume two
consumer types who have diﬀerent sensitivity to price: high-type consumers and low-type
consumers.23 At the outset, it is necessary to choose an initial number of consumers, N0.
Once this is pinned down, the future distribution of each consumer type is determined
by the consumer purchase decisions of hardware and software. In particular, consumers'
purchase decision of software in a submarket determines the number of consumers remaining
for the next period, and their purchase decision of hardware determines the number of new
consumers who enter the software market next period. In this paper, I set N0 to 100 million.
Discount Factors. Previous literature has noted that it is diﬃcult to estimate discount
factors, so I do not attempt to estimate the discount factors for consumers and software ﬁrms
(βc and βf ). Instead, I set the discount rates to 0.95, which is lower than the monthly interest
rate. However, previous studies in experimental and behavioral economics have found that
the discount factor is lower than the interest rate.
Prior Distribution. In order to estimate the model it is necessary to specify the prior
distribution for the parameters to be estimated. Consumer preference to product characteris-
tics (ψ and γ) and consumer sensitivity to price (ϕi and αi) follow normal distributions with
means of zero and large standard deviations. The initial share of high-type consumers (δ)
follows a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. To guarantee that cost parameters and
standard deviations are non-negative, their prior distributions are log-normal with means of
zero and large standard deviations.
23The number of customer types (I) should be determined by adding types till one of the type sizes is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero (Besanko et al. 2003). Nair (2007) says that the estimates for the three-type
model yielded several insigniﬁcant parameters and thus he presented the estimates for the two-type case.
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Initial Guess of Equilibrium Strategies and Value Functions. To compute the ini-
tial guess for consumer value functions and incumbent value functions I assume that both
consumers and software ﬁrms are myopic. The initial guesses for product prices are the
predicted values from a hedonic regression of price on state variables. I compute the initial
guess of the entry probability based on the initial value functions.
5.2 Posterior Statistics
I draw 100,000 samples from the posterior distribution and use the last 50,000 samples to
derive the posterior means and standard deviations. The last 50,000 samples are reported
in Table 2. I also compute the posterior means and standard deviations from the last 25,000
samples. The ﬁndings in the two sets of samples are not statistically diﬀerent. I repeat this
procedure several times and ﬁnd that the posterior statistics are robust to initial values of
parameters that are drawn from their prior distributions. I conclude that the samples I use
to compute the posterior statistics are drawn from a stable distribution.
The estimates in the consumer utility function of hardware are consistent with our ex-
pectation. High-type consumer price sensitivity to hardware is 0.018 and low-type consumer
price sensitivity to hardware is 0.064. The numbers are positive because they enter the util-
ity function as a negative term. Consumers obtain higher utility from purchasing consoles in
November or December, probably because consoles are good gifts during the holiday season.
High-type consumers correspond to 14.6 percent of the potential market at the beginning of
the console lifecyle.
The estimates in the consumer utility function of software are consistent with our ex-
pectation. Nintendo 64 games generate the highest utility because the console is more
technologically advanced than the other two. Consumers favor the games with high online
ratings, and consumers dislike games that have been in the market for a long time, partly
because most sports games are designed based on the latest tournaments. Consumers obtain
higher utility from purchasing games in November or December, probably because they can
37
spend more time playing games during holiday season. High-type consumer price sensitivity
to software is 0.014 and low-type consumer price sensitivity to software is 0.051.
Table 2: Posterior Means and Standard Deviations
Last 50,000 Samples Last 25,000 Samples
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Block 1: Demand for Hardware
α1 (H-type consumer price sensitivity) 0.018 0.004 0.018 0.003
α2 (L-type consumer price sensitivity) 0.064 0.015 0.064 0.012
γNov (Nov. dummy) 0.745 0.217 0.746 0.219
γDec (Dec. dummy) 2.405 0.903 2.399 0.903
σζ (std of hardware demand shocks) 0.105 0.581 0.106 0.612
δ (initial share of H-type consumers) 0.146 0.093 0.146 0.093
Block 2: Demand for Software
ψN64 (dummy for N64 games) 1.544 0.343 1.537 0.074
ψ1 (online rating score of games) 0.169 0.090 0.171 0.068
ψ2 (game age if new) -0.333 0.097 -0.341 0.023
ψ3 (game age if old) -0.189 0.062 -0.193 0.033
ψNov (Nov. dummy) 0.239 0.074 0.241 0.041
ψDec (Dec. dummy) 0.672 0.206 0.675 0.188
ϕ1 (H-type consumer price sensitivity) 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.002
ϕ2 (L-type consumer price sensitivity) 0.051 0.023 0.052 0.017
σξ (std of software demand shocks) 2.739 0.107 2.742 0.050
Block 3: Software Pricing
cSaturn (unit cost of games for Saturn) 14.652 2.176 14.774 2.322
cPS1 (unit cost of games for PS) 10.755 1.601 10.731 1.325
cN64 (unit cost of games for N64) 18.458 1.629 18.523 1.726
σς (std of price error) 0.879 0.220 0.895 0.154
Block 4: Software Entry
λSaturn (mean of entry cost to Saturn) 4.717 0.428 4.7292 0.170
λPS1 (mean of entry cost to PS) 3.663 0.505 3.700 0.417
λN64 (mean of entry cost to N64) 4.613 0.142 4.614 0.086
σν (std of entry cost shocks) 2.487 0.119 2.493 0.105
The cost per unit is $14.7, $10.8 and $18.5 for games released for Saturn, PS and N64,
respectively. As Coughlan (2001) reported, the production and packaging cost for 32-bit
CD-ROM games is around $1.5 per disc. Therefore, the royalty fees charged by Sega and
Sony were around $13.2 and $9.3 per copy sold. The unit cost of N64 games is much higher
than Saturn games and PS games because Nintendo used ROM cartridges to store games,
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so their production expense was much higher than the production expense for the compact
disc format that competitors used.
The average entry cost of Saturn games, PS games and N64 games are $4.7 million,
$3.7 million and $4.6 million, respectively. The standard deviation of entry cost is $2.5
million. Saturn games' research and development cost was on average signiﬁcantly higher
than PS games, partly due to Saturn's dual-CPU architecture and more complex graphics,
even though both Sega and Sony adopted very similar technology.24
5.3 Numerical Solution
To examine the ﬁt of the model, I treat the posterior means of the last 50,000 samples
as the estimated values of the parameters and numerically solve the model by using the
approximation method described in the previous section. The algorithm is programmed in
Fortran 95 and converged smoothly for those parameters. The convergence of the numerical
solution indicates the existence of a unique equilibrium at those parameter values.25 However,
it is possible that multiple equilibria exist for other parameter values.
I now compare the predicted values to those observed in the data. Figure 6 (a) compares
the predicted and the observed number of console owners. Figure 6 (b) compares the pre-
dicted and the observed cumulative sales of sports games. Overall, the model ﬁts the data
very well.
24See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sega_Saturn#cite_note-16. One very fast central processor would
be preferable. I don't think all programmers have the ability to program two CPUsmost can only get
about one-and-a-half times the speed you can get from one SH-2. I think that only 1 in 100 programmers
are good enough to get this kind of speed [nearly double] out of the Saturn.  Yu Suzuki reﬂecting upon
Saturn Virtual Fighter development.
25Generally speaking, it is diﬃcult to analytically prove the existence and uniqueness of a MPE in pure
strategy for dynamic oligopoly models. I have proved that, under some restrictions, there exists a unique
equilibrium in pure strategy for a dynamic oligopoly pricing model with forward-looking consumers. Yet it
is extremely hard to go further to show the equilibrium existence for this model which also contains software
ﬁrms' dynamic entry and consumers' self-selection to platforms. Without analytical solutions, I am unable
to formally state whether an equilibrium exists and whether it is unique.
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Figure 6: Actual vs. Fitted Accumulative Sales of Consoles and Games
(a) Sega Saturn
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(b) Sony PlayStation
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(c) Nintendo 64
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Note: Solid lines represent actual data. Dashed lines are ﬁtted values.
Figure 7 (a) compares the predicted and the observed prices across all sports games
at each game's age, or months since the game's introduction. The ﬁgure indicates that the
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proposed model is able to explain the declining pattern of game price. However, the predicted
price does not drop as quickly the observed price. One possible reason is that the model
does not consider the second-hand market that contributes to the declining game price in
the data. Figure 7 (b) compares the predicted and the observed unit sales across all sports
games at each age. The ﬁgure shows that the model ﬁts the data very well.
Figure 7: Actual vs. Fitted Game Price and Unit Sales in Age






      



	



	



	
	







      




	





	



			
Note: Solid lines represent actual data. Dashed lines are ﬁtted values.
6 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, I make use of the recovered parameters in the demand and supply model
to conduct counterfactual exercises. The goal is to explore what contributed to the Sega
Saturn's failure. To be more speciﬁc, would Sega have survived if it had taken alternative
options such as charging lower console prices or subsidizing software entry in its initial stage?
In the ﬁrst counterfactual exercise, I examine what would happen if Sega had lowered
its console prices by $100 for the ﬁrst two years. The second counterfactual exercise looks
at whether Sega would have survived if it had reduced game producers' entry cost. In each
scenario, I change Sega's entry fee and simulate both the number of console owners and
the number of associated games. This approach might be doubted because the competing
platforms would react to the change. Unfortunately, this paper does not focus on the pricing
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competition among platforms. As a result, I do not know competing platforms' best response
functions. However, the simulation results of changing one platform and ﬁxing the others
still shed some light on how a platform's prices aﬀect that platform's formation process. The
simulation quantitatively measures how responsive consumers and software ﬁrms are to a
platform's introductory prices.
6.1 Lowering Console Price
Figure 2 (a) presents the prices of the three ﬁfth-generation consoles in every month during
the sample period. Console prices were generally declining over time. The ﬁgure also shows
that Sega's console prices were $100 higher than competitors' prices at the same age for the
ﬁrst two years. A high console price discouraged consumer entry and hence software entry.
It is speculated that this contributed to Sega's failure. In this counterfactual, I consider
what would happen if Sega had reduced its console prices by $100 for the ﬁrst two years.
The goal is to investigate whether Sega could have survived if it had charged lower prices to
consumers. The simulated results are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Results of Counterfactural 1: Lowering Sega's Console Price
Observed Data Counterfactual
Sega Saturn:
Hardware owners (2/2002, m) 1.28 9.71
Software accumulative units sold (2/2002, m) 2.11 16.02
Sony PlayStation:
Hardware owners (2/2002, m) 28.25 20.95
Software accumulative units sold (2/2002, m) 75.97 59.60
Nintendo 64:
Hardware owners (2/2002, m) 17.17 14.91
Software accumulative units sold (2/2002, m) 27.84 21.65
With the proposed price schedule for Sega, the number of Sega console owners would
increase by around 8 million at the end of the sample period (February 2002), and its
cumulative sports game sales would increase by around 14 million units. Because the $100
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price reduction is not a negligible number, the impact on consumer adoption of hardware
and software sales are considerably large. In one-sided markets, the responsiveness of the
quantity demanded to a price change depends on consumers' elasticity. However, in two-
sided markets, the responsiveness of the quantity demanded not only depends on consumers'
elasticity on the good but on the strength of the indirect network eﬀects. For example, a
lower console price attracts new users and hence new games; games attract extra new users,
and so on. When consumers are very sensitive to hardware price and game producers highly
value the installed base of users, a change in the hardware price would have a huge impact.
However, when consumers are inelastic and game producers do not value the installed base
as much, the impact of a change in the hardware price would not be that big.
Due to the lower console price, Sega would lose $421.5 million on the console side of the
market. However, the increased sales of the sports games would lead to an extra $183.61
million in royalty fees from the game producers. Since I only know the increased royalty
fees from the sports games, the total net gain from this subsidy package is unknown. If
non-sports games behave the same way as the sports games, then the increased royalty fees
from all games would be scaled up to 831.44 ( = 183.61*240/53 ) million dollars26. As a
result, the total net gain would be $409.94 million. Therefore, reducing the console price in
the initial stage would be very eﬀective in promoting Sega's platform size and increasing its
proﬁt.
Sony PlayStation would suﬀer from Sega's lower console price strategy. PlayStation's
installed base of users would decrease by around 7 million, and its accumulated sports game
sales would decrease by around 16 million. Nintendo 64 would not be aﬀected as much.
PlayStation technology and entry time were almost the same as Saturn's, and therefore was
the main rival of Saturn. However, N64 was more technologically advanced and entered the
market one and a half years later than Saturn, and hence was not Saturn's direct competitor.
26The sample contains 240 Saturn games in total among which 53 games are sports games.
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6.2 Subsidize Software Entry
The estimates of the entry costs of the game producers to the three platforms are considerably
diﬀerent from each other. Saturn's entry cost for games is on average signiﬁcantly higher
than PS games. High entry cost discourages software entry and thus discourages consumer
entry. In this counterfactual, I consider what would happen if Sega had given game producers
a subsidy of $1 million per game title. Even though a software producer's entry cost does not
directly go to platform providers' pockets, platforms can still strategically inﬂuence these
software entry fees, either by oﬀering easier-learning development technology or by directly
subsidizing software research and development.
Table 4: Results of Counterfactural 2: Lowering the Entry Cost of Sega Games
Observed Data Counterfactual
Sega Saturn:
Hardware owners (2/2002, m) 1.28 4.73
Software accumulative units sold (2/2002, m) 2.11 7.36
Sony PlayStation:
Hardware owners (2/2002, m) 28.25 24.78
Software accumulative units sold (2/2002, m) 75.97 68.34
Nintendo 64:
Hardware owners (2/2002, m) 17.17 16.08
Software accumulative units sold (2/2002, m) 27.84 25.22
Table 4 reports the simulation results. Sega would attract 12 new sports games. This
requires Sega pay a $65-million subsidy to the producers of sports games. Sega's hardware
users would increase by around 3.46 million at the end of the sample period, and its cumu-
lative sports game sales would increase by around 5.25 million. The increased sales of sports
games would generate $69.3 million in royalty fees for Sega. As a result, this subsidizing
package would generate a net gain of $4.3 million from the sports games. If non-sports games
behave the same as sports games, then the total net gain would be scaled up to 19.47 ( =
4.3*240/53 ) million dollars. Therefore, subsidizing software entry would not help Sega very
much. This result indicates that when compared to the high console prices to consumers,
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the high entry cost to software ﬁrms was not the main cause of Sega's failure. This might
be because software ﬁrms were not as sensitive to entry costs, or because consumers did not
value software variety as much, or both.
Under this counterfactual, PlayStation's console owners would decrease by around 3.47
million and its cumulative sports game sales would drop by around 7.63 million. Nintendo
64 would not suﬀer very much.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I present a dynamic structural model to study consumers' demand for hardware
and associated software, and software ﬁrms' entry and pricing decisions. I examine Sega's
alternative strategic options such as reducing its console prices for the ﬁrst two years or
subsidizing software entry. For each alternative option, I simulate the number of participants
and Sega's revenue. The results show that Sega would have survived if it had reduced console
price by $100 in the launching stage, and that subsidizing software entry would not have
helped Sega walk out of the death spiral.
This paper provides a framework to structurally model a two-sided market, especially
a hardware-software market. On the consumer side, the value of a hardware platform de-
pends on the expected value of optimally purchasing software products associated with that
platform. Moreover, the number of potential buyers for a software product depends on the
number of users who have adopted the compatible hardware. The demand system of the
model accounts for dynamic selection of forward-looking and heterogeneous consumers into
platforms for aﬃliated software products, and allows for the contingency of platforms' value
on the availability and prices of the aﬃliated products. By incorporating the complementar-
ity between hardware and software, I am able to examine the eﬀects that subsidizing entry
of the software side has on consumer entry to a platform.
On the software side, software producers compete within a submarket. Incumbents choose
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their prices, and potential entrants choose whether to enter. Potential entrants strategically
account for competitor reactions and consumer responses. I have investigated the impacts
that subsidizing entry on the consumer side has on software producers' entry and price
choices. Counterfactual experiments demonstrate that lowering console price has signiﬁ-
cantly increased consumer entry and therefore software entry.
This paper also develops a practical Bayesian MCMC procedure for structural estimation
of dynamic models. I use the outcomes from past MCMC iteration to approximate each
agent's equilibrium strategy and value function for the current draw of parameter vector.
This estimation procedure signiﬁcantly reduces computational burden. To avoid computing
the value function at all possible points of the state space, I combine the nonparametric
approximation method and interpolation method. I also implement the estimation procedure
to estimate a dynamic model in the video game market. The estimation procedure can be
used to estimate other dynamic models, especially those with unobserved heterogeneity and
large state space.
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A Substitution of the Software Market
In this paper, I assume that software products in the same submarket are substitutable and
submarkets are separate from each other. Below I specify three diﬀerent regression models
to test the substitution between sports games, and the results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Empirical Results of Testing Software Competition Structure
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
price ($) ln(qjt) ln(qjt)
its own price -.0126∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗
(.0019) (.002)
competition in the same submarket -.148∗∗ -.0359∗∗∗ -.219∗∗∗
(.060) (.0045) (.019)
competition from other submarkets -.011 .0002 -.012
(0.066) (.0004) (.024)
online rating score 1.417∗∗∗ .3419∗∗∗ .261∗∗∗
(.047) (.0099) (.010)
product age (months) -1.141∗∗∗ -.1988∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗
(.015) (.0099) (.004)
age square .013∗∗∗ .0015∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.002) (.0000) (.000)
market size (million) 3.353∗∗∗ .2438∗∗∗ .803∗∗∗
(.088) (.0466) (.034)
R-square 0.68 0.63 0.53
observations 13779 13024 12794
Notes: ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 10 percent level; ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5 percent level; and
∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.
In the ﬁrst regression, the dependent variable is a game's price and the independent
variables include: (i) the competition level within a submarket measured by the number of
existing games in the same market; (ii) the competition from other submarkets measured by
the number of existing games in all other submarkets; (iii) observed characteristics including
the online rating score and the game age measured by the months after release; (iv) the
market size measured by the log of the console owners; and (v) monthly dummies. The ﬁrst
important result is that the price of an existing game is lower by $0.148 if additional game is
released in the same submarket and this impact is statistically signiﬁcant. It implies that the
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competition within a market is strong. The second important result is that the competition
eﬀect from other submarkets is not statistically signiﬁcant, which implies that submarkets
are separate from each other. Besides, the game price is increasing in its online rating score,
declining in its age and increasing in the number of console owners.
In the second regression, the dependent variable is the log of a game's unit sales (measured
in thousands). The independent variables are the same as in the ﬁrst model except that I
include an extra independent variable, the current price. To address the endogeneity of the
price, I use the lagged price as an instrument for the current price. The third column in table
5 lists the estimation results which are consistent with the assumption of strong competition
within a market and weak competition across markets.
The last regression mimics Nair (2007).27 I still use the log of a game's unit sales as the
dependent variable. However, I use the log of the total unit sales of all existing games in
the same submarket to measure the competition level within a submarket, and the log of
the total unit sales of all existing games in other submarkets to measure the competition
eﬀect from other submarkets. To address the endogeneity problem, I use the lagged price as
an instrument for the current price, the number of existing games within the a submarket
as an instrument for the within-submarket sales, and the number of existing games in other
submarkets as an instrument for the outside-submarket sales. The results also show that
the substitution eﬀect within a submarket is strong while the substitution from games sold
in other markets is insigniﬁcant.
27In Nair (2007), the dependent variable is ln(sjt/s0t), where sjt is the market share of game j and s0t is
the share of the outside good. He uses ln(sjt|g/s0t) to measure the eﬀect within a market, where sjt|g is the
share of units sales of the game within its genre, g. He ﬁnds that the substitution eﬀect from other games
with the same game genre is not signiﬁcant, and thus he concludes that video games are separate from each
other.
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B Computation
B.1 Jacobian Matrix
The Jacobian Matrix in equation (12) is
J(qmt→ξmt) ≡‖ ∇ξmtqmt ‖=

∂q1t/∂ξ1t ... ∂q1t/∂ξJt
...
. . .
...
∂qJt/∂ξ1t · · · ∂qJt/∂ξJt

with
∂qjt
∂ξlt
=

−∑Ii=1 nmit [bijtbilt + βcbijtbim0t ∂EGmit+1∂ξlt ] if l 6= j∑I
i=1 nmit
[
bijt(1− bijt) + βcbijtbim0t ∂EGmit+1∂ξjt
]
if l = j
Here, bim0t = 1−
∑
j∈Jmt
bijt is the probability of not purchasing. Notice that ∂EGmit/∂ξjt and
∂bim0t/∂ξjt are determined by the following system of equations:
∂EGmit+1
∂ξjt
=
∑
l
∂EGmit+1
∂nmlt+1
nmlt
∂bim0t
∂ξjt
for all i
∂bim0t
∂ξjt
= −bijtbim0t + βcbim0t(1− bim0t)dEGmit+1dξjt for all i
In the application part, I only assume two types of consumers. So, the above system includes
four linear equations and four unknowns. It is not hard to solve for ∂EGmit/∂ξjt for all i.
B.2 Best Response in Price
An incumbent software ﬁrm's problem is to pick a price to maximize the discounted proﬁt:
max
p˜jt
pij(p˜jt, p−jt, smt) + βfE [Vjt+1(smt+1) | smt, p˜jt,Ψ−j] ,
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with
pij(pjt, p−jt, smt) = (pjt − c)
[∑
i
nmitbij(pjt, p−jt, smt)
]
bij(pjt, p−jt, smt) =
exp(xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt)
exp[βcEGit+1(pmt+1, smt+1 | pjt, p−jt, smt)] +
∑
j∈Jmt
exp(xjtψ − ϕipjt + ξjt) .
Below I show how to compute the marginal eﬀect of current price on software ﬁrms' con-
tinuation values. Take an incumbent j's continuation value, E [Vjt+1(smt+1) | smt, p˜jt,Ψ−j],
for example. The state vector smt includes the number of existing games in the same sub-
market, the number of active high-type consumers, the number of active low-type con-
sumers, the value of the No. 1 product in the same submarket, and its own consump-
tion value. Notice that given competitors' prices and entrants' entry probabilities, a soft-
ware's current price only aﬀects the number of next-period active consumers but not other
next-period state variables. The number of next-period active consumers is the sum of
the number of consumers who do not make any purchase today and the number of new
consumers: nmit+1 = nmitbm0it + Qmit, from which we can obtain the analytical form of
∂smt+1(pjt, p−jt, smt)/∂pjt. Furthermore, along the estimation procedure, I approximated the
value functions Vjt+1(smt+1) by using polynomial regression in state variables. Therefore, I
can pin down how current price aﬀects the expectation of the next-period value function.
A similar approach can be applied to computing the marginal eﬀect of current price on
consumers' continuation values.
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